Budget Bills Originate in the House of Representatives
Power of the Pocketbook
Historical Highlight
"All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may advise or concur with amendments as on other Bills."
— U.S. Constitution, Article I, department 7, clause one
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, simply in Consequence of Appropriations fabricated by Law; and a regular Argument and Business relationship of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."
— U.South. Constitution, Commodity I, section ix, clause 7
/tiles/non-drove/i/i_origins_power_purse_approps_lc.xml Image courtesy of the Library of Congress The Firm Appropriations Committee in 1918 featuring (from left to correct) future Secretarial assistant of State James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, former Speaker Joseph Cannon of Illinois, Chairman J. Swagar Sherley of Kentucky, time to come Speaker Frederick Gillett of Massachusetts, future Secretary of War James W. Good of Iowa, and futurity Speaker Joseph Byrns of Tennessee.
Congress—and in detail, the House of Representatives—is invested with the "power of the purse," the ability to revenue enhancement and spend public money for the national regime. Massachusetts' Elbridge Gerry said at the Federal Ramble Convention that the House "was more immediately the representatives of the people, and information technology was a maxim that the people ought to hold the handbag-strings."
Origins
English history heavily influenced the Constitutional framers. The British Business firm of Commons has the exclusive right to create taxes and spend that revenue, which is considered the ultimate check on purple say-so. Indeed, the American colonists' cry of "No taxation without representation!" referred to the injustice of London imposing taxes on them without the do good of a vocalisation in Parliament.
Constitutional Framing
Debate at the Constitutional Convention centered on 2 bug. The first was to ensure that the executive would not spend money without congressional authorization. The 2d concerned the roles the Business firm and Senate would play in setting fiscal policy.
At the Convention, the framers considered the extent to which the Senate—similar the Firm of Lords—should be express in its consideration of budget bills. The provision was part of a compromise between the large and small-scale states. Smaller states, which would exist over-represented in the Senate, would concede the power to originate money bills to the House, where states with larger populations would accept greater control. Speaking in favor of the provision, Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania said, "It was a saying that those who feel, can all-time judge. This end would . . . be all-time attained, if coin affairs were to be confined to the immediate representatives of the people." The provision in the committee's study to the Convention was adopted, five to three, with three states divided on the question. The Convention reconsidered the matter over the class of ii months, but the provision was finally adopted, 9 to ii, in September 1787.
The constitutional provision making Congress the ultimate say-so on government spending passed with far less debate. The framers were unanimous that Congress, as the representatives of the people, should exist in command of public funds—not the President or executive branch agencies. This strongly-held belief was rooted in the framers' experiences with England, where the male monarch had broad latitude over spending once the money had been raised.
The Early Appropriations Process
The First Congress (1789–1791) passed the first appropriations act—a mere xiii lines long—a few months after it convened. The law funded the government, including important pensions for Revolutionary State of war veterans, with just $639,000—an amount in the tens of millions in real terms. This unproblematic process was short-lived. Over fourth dimension, nine regular appropriation bills emerged and funded such priorities equally pensions, harbors, the postal service office, and the armed services. These were considered on an annual footing by the late 1850s. The Business firm Committee on Means and Means, which too had jurisdiction over tax policy, controlled the appropriations process. Just legislation and funding were always kept dissever. Priorities were spelled out in one law and money appropriated for those priorities in another. This has remained the practise, every bit substantive committees design dominance acts and the House and Senate Appropriation Committees fund authorized programs later. Indeed, there are laws and parliamentary rules against making new law in appropriation bills, although such rules are periodically waived.
Subsequent Reforms
In 1865, after the Civil War had created a almost $3 billion national debt and spending exceeded a billion dollars a year, Congress reformed its funding process to handle the regime'south new demands. The House separated the Ways and Means Committee'southward taxing and spending functions. The Appropriations Committee was established to fund programs, while Ways and Means retained jurisdiction on tax policy. House leadership and other committees besides tried to influence the appropriations process, and the lack of coordination over the years led to high deficits and the implementation of the federal income tax in 1913. Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Human activity in 1921 to address some of the coordination issues it faced funding government programs. This law centralized many of the budgeting functions with the President, who notwithstanding has considerable agenda-setting power with the federal upkeep and submits a draft upkeep to Congress at the beginning of every twelvemonth. The appropriations process has been reformed multiple times since 1921, including notable restructurings with the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Acts of 1985 and 1987.
For Farther Reading
Farrand, Max, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Rev. ed. four vols. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1937).
Garfield, James. "National Appropriations and Misappropriations," North American Review, 270: 572–586.
Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew D. McCubbins. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Procedure. (Chicago: The Academy of Chicago Press, 1991).
Kimmel, Lewis. Federal Budget and Financial Policy, 1789–1958. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1959).
Leloup, Lance. The Fiscal Congress. (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980).
Schick, Allen. Congress and Money: Budgeting, Spending and Taxing. (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1980).
—. The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000).
Selko, Daniel. The Federal Financial Organisation. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1940).
Stewart, Charles H., III. Upkeep Reform Politics: The Pattern of the Appropriations Process in the Firm of Representatives, 1865–1921. (New York: Cambridge Academy Press, 1989).
Wildavsky, Aaron B. Budgeting and Governing. (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006).
—. The New Politics of the Monetary Process. 5th ed. (New York: Longman, 2003).
Source: https://history.house.gov/institution/origins-development/power-of-the-purse/
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